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In this chapter, we begin with a confession. This work is derived from our existing 
publications over a twenty year period on Foucault’s notion of confession and its 
enactments within the education of adults (Edwards and Usher 1995, Usher and 
Edwards 1998, 2004, 2007). In this chapter, we draw selectively upon Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) to enhance and extend our use of Foucault’s later work to develop our 
understanding of the significance of guidance work with adults in education and how 
we might research that empirically. We suggest that approaches adopted from ANT 
provide a useful trajectory through which to provide more effectively a theoretical and 
methodological basis for the empirical study of confessional practices.  
 
While aspects of ANT has become influential in research in education in recent years 
as part of wider interests in sociomaterialism (see Fenwick and Edwards 2010), it has 
received little attention in the realms of guidance or the wider study of confessional 
practices. What we wish to do in this chapter is to explore the ways in which a 
particular type of human subject is centred and stabilised through the humanistic 
discourses of guidance, but to do so without ourselves drawing on humanistic 
discourse. We also wish to outline ways in which this could be explored empirically. 
In order to do this, we will briefly reprise some of our previous work on Foucuault’s 
framing of confession and pastoral power. However, we will suggest also that 
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Foucualt’s work is suggestive rather than empirically substantive. We will then 
discuss the ways in which aspects of ANT can be used to extend empirically our 
understanding of confessional practices in the formation of subjects through guidance. 
The aim is to provide a stronger empirical base through which to enhance our 
understanding of the work that certain practices of guidance do and, in this way, to 
think guidance differently as forms of confession associated with particular framings 
of subjectivity and power. We will also be suggesting that, while confession may be 
taken up as a totalising concept with data being retro-fitted to the concept, the 
empirical study of confessional enactments is likely to indicate confession’s 
multiplicity in the exercises of certain forms of power in the ordering of the social and 
the need to extend and develop our understanding of the concept beyond that put 
forward by Foucault (1981). 
 
The humanist subject – origin/effect? 
While there are different strands in the discourses of guidance in education, there is a 
certain commonality in the assumption that these practices, as well as being more 
efficient in matching educational opportunities and adult choice, are also more 
progressive. While there is a more market oriented focus to some guidance discourses, it 
is suggested more commonly that they provide a more 'humane', 'democratic' and 
'empowering' contribution to educational experiences. They are said to be part of more 
student-centred approaches, unlike more traditional transmission and authoritarian modes 
of educational provision. The argument is that the more the individual is given the 
opportunity to engage in understanding themselves, their capabilities and the choices 
available to them and to make their own more 'authentic' choices, the more power they 
accrue. The result is a greater degree of personal development, self-actualisation and 
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empowerment through the educational experience. Guidance develops self-knowledge 
and knowledge of educational opportunities, enabling better interactions and outcomes. 
 
The basis for this discursive construction is the humanistic psychology most commonly 
associated with Carl Rogers (see for example 1961, 1980 and 1983). Here therapeutic 
notions of the importance of feelings to the authentic all round development and 
expression of self are translated into educational discourses and practices where self-
development and self-realisation become framed as central normative goals for 
individuals and educational institutions, embracing the affective as well as the cognitive 
and rational selves. Individual experiences and feelings are inserted into educational 
processes and become the means by which rationality, skills and attitudes are developed 
more fully. Thus, it is the whole person rather than simply the intellectual 'head' and/or 
psychomotor ‘hands' that engages in and is affected by the educational processes. This 
discourse, framed within the psychotherapeutic, has had a very powerful effect, not only 
in influencing liberal education, but also in the fields of training, vocational education 
and human resource development. Its ubiquity has led some to argue more critically that 
contemporary forms of social order are therapeutic in a negative sense, promoting 
victimhood rather than empowerment in populations (e.g. Ecclestone and Hayes 2009, 
Wright 2010). The humanistic discourses of guidance can be seen therefore as playing a 
very important role in the contemporary structuring of educational opportunities for 
adults. Under the influence of these discourses, and setting aside the critiques, it would 
appear that both guidance and education more generally have become more humane. This 
is suggested as emerging from putting adults at the centre of the process, as the origin 
from which their development is supported through guidance and the provision of 
appropriate educational opportunities. 
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However, our argument, following Foucault, is that the human subject is precisely centred 
as such through such humanistic practices; the subject is an effect within a network of 
relations rather than a point of origin from which all else unfolds. This is a position 
pursued in great detail in the works of researchers such as Rose (1991, 1998, 1999). We 
argue therefore that, even if the discourses and practices of guidance have become ever 
more humane, it does not necessarily follow that power in modern society is more 
extensively distributed or that its exercise is becoming less pervasive, let alone that 
humanistic subjectivities are freed from its influence. On the contrary, more human(e) 
does not equate with the diminution of regulatory power. It may lead to more, albeit 
different forms of, regulatory power. However, unlike those who argue that this simply 
produces therapeutic victimhood, we have previosuly argued, like Foucault, that there are 
active subjectivities being formed through such processes (Edwards and Usher 1995). To 
be(come) human is itself therefore a manifestation of exercises of certain forms of power. 
In particular, these are subjectivities associated with the exercise of pastoral power, and 
with practices of confession, to which we now turn. 
 
Confession  
The discussion of confession is very much tied into Foucuault's (1981) study of sexuality. 
It is also linked to his wider discussion of the different forms of power developing with 
the emergence of modern state and institutional forms of governing (Foucualt 1979a, 
1979b). We will focus primarily on the link to his work on sexuality.  
 
Rejecting the popular view of the 19th century as a period of sexual repression where it is 
suggested that speaking of sex was taboo, Foucault (1981) charted the massive increase in 
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discourses on and about sexuality during that era. He argues that in bringing forth the 
body as an object of knowledge, 'sexuality' not only became the subject of discourse but 
also ever more closely subject to regulation. To name is therefore also to attempt to 
regulate. Foucault describes the notion of sexual represssion as an example of the broader 
'repressive hypothesis', the view that power is always a constraint wielded by the 
powerful to limit or ‘repress’ the powerless. Foucault argues that power should instead be 
seen as an active, productive force that mobilises subjectivities and enacts subject 
positions. The exercise of power does nto Ismply enact victimhood, but also and at the 
same time evokes active subjectivities. This is a process that is empowering in the sense 
that it enables action, but it also serves as a means for the regulation of subjects. Here 
freedom is not the opposite of constraint. Freddom is possible in certain forms only 
because of the constraints and possibilities elicited through specific exercises of power. 
One cannot do away with the exercise of power, but one can change its geometries. 
 
The notion of repression foregrounded by humanistic and therapeutic discourses therefore 
misconstrues this growth of regulation. Regulation is not constituted solely by repression, 
and the absence of overt regulation does not necessarily mean that repression is no longer 
present. To argue this way hides the work that practices of sexuality do in constituting 
and mobilising autonomous self-expressing subjects freed from overt constraints, yet who 
nonetheless remain regulated through regulating themselves. Action is not based upon 
autonomous agency, but on different geometries of power. All this is concealed In 
humansitic discourses, since one effect of the repressive hypothesis is that a particular 
view of sexuality is 'naturalised', or made an inherent characteristic of the embodied 
subject, thus concealing the effects of particular practices in framing particuklar 
manifestions of sexuality and the regulated body. 
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In a Focucauldian view, people are positioned in a variety of subject positions, such as 
'woman', 'man', 'child', 'parent', ‘teacher’, ‘learner’,  'lover', 'clever', 'pushy', ‘gay’. It is 
through this positioning by a network of multiple determinations that the affective and 
effective governing of people is secured (Rose 1999). To be a person is to occupy a 
subject position within a discourse, what Law (2001) refers to as a ‘knowing location’. By 
talking about positioning we can see therefore that power can now be more resourcefully 
understood as relational, capillary and spatial, rather thans simply as a thing to be wielded 
by individuals and collectivities, such as the state. In problematising notions of ‘essence’ 
or ‘human nature’, as this does, we can argue that persons are not 'natural' givens in the 
world, nor is knowledge of them a process of discovering or uncovering their underlying 
reality. All is emergent. However, these notions precisely act as assumptions at the heart 
of humanistic notions that guidance enables individuals to authentically express their own 
true feelings, interests and circumstances. By contrast, Foucault (1981) argues that 
persons are rather framed through knowledgeable or expert discourses and normalising 
practices, such as humanistic psychology and their accompanying guidance and 
therapeutic practices. This knowledge and expertise is conditional upon, and a condition 
for, the exercise of particular forms of power, even as it is presented as a neutral process, 
or more accurately especially if it is presented as a neutral, ‘scientific’ process. 
 
Discourses which bring to the fore the efficacy of guidance in eliciting one's self as an 
object of knowledge are therefore educational practices whose work is to constitute and 
make open for intervention those aspects of a person which have hitherto remained 
unspoken (Besley 2002). They are enacted through the relations and practices of 
confession rather than preceding those practices. To fabricate one’s subjectivity as an 
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object of knowledge is to discover the 'truth' about oneself where whoever guides this 
process plays an active and powerful role. In relation to sexuality, Foucault argued that 
the confessional practices of the Christian church were about the discursive 
transformation of desire in order that sex could be 'policed' rather than 
suppressed/repressed. Policing is regulatory rather than simply repressive. Regulation and 
governing displace oppression in the exercise of power, although the latter remains an 
ever-present possibilitiy. This process has spread and now encompasses not only 
sexuality but also education, health and lifestyle. It has become central in the governance 
of modern society, where externally imposed discipline has given way to the self-
discipline of an autonomous subjectivity.  
 
Thus, provocatively, Foucault (1981: 59) proclaims that 'Western man [sic] has become a 
confessing animal' . Here the purpose of confession shifts from one of salvation to that of 
self-regulation, self-improvement and self-development. In other words, confession 
actively mobilises a productive and autonomous subject, but one who is already governed 
and in this way there is no requirement for externally imposed discipline.  
The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in justice, 
medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary 
affairs of everyday life, and in the most solemn rites... One confesses in public and 
in private, to one's parents, one's educators, one's doctors, to those one loves... 
(Foucault 1981: 59) 
It is in the very process of confessing that people are enacted and enact themselves as 
speaking and desiring subjects, a knowing location. At the same time, they are entangled 
in exercises of power as they become subject to the authority and authoritative discourses 
of the partner (the confessor) within the transaction. The confessors include not only the 
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priest but also the therapist, the counsellor and the educator, and, through for instance, 
interactive computer programmes and self-help books, this role can also take non-human 
forms. The confessional transaction generates material spoken by the confessing subject, 
a body of knowledge through which subjects are inscribed in particular ways.  
 
These conceptual resources therefore enable us to see practices of guidance in education 
as forms of confession where the meanings ascribed to subjectivity and experience are 
already effects of pastoral power because of the confessional transaction involved. In 
order to participate successfully in confession, persons need to be confessing subjects. In 
other words, they are required to have already accepted or have been normalised to accept 
the legitimacy of confessional practices and the 'truth' of the particular meanings that 
these invoke. Thus, in guiding adult learners, there needs to be an acceptance on the part 
of learners that they are indeed learners, that they are positioned as a particular kind of 
learner, and as such are in need of learning for own their further development. A whole 
intellectual technology is mobilised in the attempt to stabilise such understandings of the 
self and guidance and associated educational practices (Edwards 2003).  
 
Yet even as confession has become central to modern forms of governing, its status as a 
'regime of truth', a particular power-knowledge formation, has been enacted as humanstic 
development and empowerment. In this sense, and in line with Foucault's general 
position, it could be argued that the most effective forms of power are those which 
precisely are not recognised as powerful. This is because they are either cloaked in the 
esoteric but 'objective' knowledge of expertise or because subjects internalise the 
humanistic discourse of helping and personal empowerment. Power-knowledge 
formations such as this intertwine expertise and personal empowerment, thereby 
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displacing the need for active containment and overt oppression. In confessing, we are 
normed and become normal. 
The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so 
deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that 
constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret 
nature, ‘demands’ only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a 
constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weighs it down, and it can 
finally be articulated only at the price of a kind of liberation. (Foucault 1981: 60) 
Thus, an active, autonomous and productive subjectivity is mobilised in confessional 
practices even as it remains a subject enacted through the power-knowledge formations 
that bring forth this form of subjectivity and invest it with significance (Rose 1998). It 
becomes ‘natural’ to confess, but what precisely are the forms of power at play? 
 
Power  
Foucault refers to the type of power exercised through confession as pastoral. This is an 
important component of contemporary governmentality, which Foucault (1979b: 20) 
defines as 'an ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex 
form of power'. For Foucault, the notion of governmentality is a way of thinking power 
differently. In the discussion of the repressive hypothesis he argues that power should not 
be seen as 'thing like'; a repressive force wielded by some over others. The notion of 
governmentality points to the dispersed, networked capillary nature of power and its 
embodiment in rational forms of governing, administration, management and supervision, 
what Miller and Rose (1993: 83) term 'government at a distance'.  
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In his work, Foucault distinguished analytically between pastoral and disciplinary power. 
Disciplinary power refers to those processes through which knowledge about the 
population is gained by government and where this knowledge functions as a condition 
for the effective management and governance of the people. These processes are 
embedded in the expert discourses of the human sciences, sciences that provide 
knowledge about, for instance, madness, deviancy, crime, and education. In modern 
social orders, disciplinary and pastoral power are in practice intertwined. In contemporary 
practices of governmentality these two forms of power-knowledge work interactively to 
bring into being individuals who actively and willingly (in the desiring sense of the term) 
participate in disciplinary regimes. They invest their own subjectivities and desires with 
those ascribed to them through the knowledgeable discourses of the disciplines. In this 
sense, the authority of confessional practices relies in part on the emergence of what Rose 
(1999) refers to as the ‘psy’ discipines, in particular psychology. 
 
People are being encouraged to drive themselves ever harder, to accept even greater 
individual responsibility for themselves and their contributions to organisations and the 
social order. 'Choice' and 'development' govern the guidance process, yet the senses of 
autonomy and responsibility this enacts only engenders an even greater requirement for 
guidance as the stress of the apparent self-government engendered by confession serves to 
create its own problems. In other words, confession and pastoral power becomes self-
replicating, a self-sustaining dynamic creating the conditions for there own proliferation 
and endless iteration. Due to their basis in the process of confession and circulation of 
pastoral power, the very guidance processes through which people's difficulties are meant 
to be resolved actually result in further dislocation, as the sense of individual 
responsibility for one's condition, for the development of an autonomous and 
 11 
individualistic subjectivity and its accompanying stresses displace more social 
sensibilities. Thus, confession can be seen to play a central aspect in the individualisation 
characteristic of pastoral power in contemporary social orders. 
For a long time, the individual was vouched for by the reference of others and the 
demonstration of his [sic] ties to the commonweal (family, allegiance, protection); 
then he was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to 
pronounce concerning himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart 
of the procedures of individualisation by power. (Foucault 1981: 58-9). 
 
It may be argued that this process of individualisation is a condition for the greater 
personal freedom experienced through the humane and emancipatory discourses of 
modernity. At one level, individualisation does provide the grounds for greater 
responsibility for self and enterprise as the limiting and constraining ties of kinship, 
community and tradition break down. This is a common enough argument. However, as 
we have seen, at another level, this can be seen more as the fashioning of a new form of 
subjectivity and a reconfiguration of the way in which power is exercised rather than its 
transcendence. In this sense, the very breakdown of alternative ties that bind is the result 
of the shaping and displacement engendered by pastoral power. The confessional 
practices of guidance have become a technology of governing and norming. The 
humanistic discourses of guidance which individualise learners are already part of an 
edifice of pastoral power, of a form of governmentality that itself needs to be 
problematised and addressed. 
 
How then does this exercise of power take place? Foucault provides a suggestive 
argument for the work of confession. However, this is largely historical and textual, as his 
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mutli-volume history of sexuality extended backwards into Ancient Greece from his 
initial exploration of the repressive hypothesis in the 19
th
 century. It also focuses on the 
qualities of the relationship of confession more than through a detailed empirical tracing 
of its practices. This then raises some interesting questions for those who want to research 
contemporary practices of confession and explore the extent to which this 
conceptualisation is still valid. Theoretically and methodologically, how might we 
explore the existence, nature and extent of confessional practices in current social orders? 
Here we believe actor-network theory has much to offer. 
 
The ANT-ics of confessing 
ANT is not a single unified theory, as it has developed and diverged over time. For Latour 
(1999a), it not simply a theory at all. We only draw slectively on ANT for this chapter. 
Furthermore, the relationship between actor-network theory and the work of Foucault is 
not a simple question to address. For Law (1992: 5): 
Actor-Network theory is all about power – power as a concealed or misrepresented 
effect, rather than power as a set of causes. Here it is close to Foucault but it is not 
simply Foucauldian for, eschewing the synchronic, it tells empirical stories about 
processes of translation.  
In other words, Law is suggesting that, while Foucault juxtasupposes aspects of the 
social order in suggestive ways, he does not provide detailed observational studies of 
contemporary practices. We want to argue that such observational studies are 
necessary in establishing whether or not the juxtapositions are justifiable or not and 
thus the nature and extent to which confession and pastoral power are conceptually 
sufficently to understanding aspects of social ordering today.  
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To do this, we suggest that guidance practices can be seen as actor-networks where 
participants and participation are ordered in time and space and where there are 
configurations of the human and non-human in the confessing relationship of 
guidance. The confessing human subject is an effect of these orderings, not the point 
of origin. These networks ‘expand, contract and shift configuration over time, and 
even the most stable and predictable of them are constantly being reappropriated and 
redefined by the nature of the flows that animate them…’ (Nespor 1994: 12). They 
provide different possibilities for understanding and self-understanding, as ‘left to 
their own devices human actions and words do not spread very far at all’ (Law 1994: 
24). Here the actions of subjects rely less on their own inherent capabilities and more 
on their relational character. To confess and what we confess is not simply a matter of 
humans emptying themselves as we would empty a bucket of water, but emerges from 
particular relational practices of the human and non-human that can be studied 
empirically. Thus ‘all the attributes we normally ascribe to human beings, are 
generated in networks that pass through and ramify both within and beyond the 
body… an actor is also, always, a network’ (Law 1992: 384). These can be traced 
observationally through what in ANT is referred to methodologically as following the 
actor. 
 
In ANT, a network is constituted by the relationality of the different components, not 
by the actors themselves. To be an actor is not to be an origin of agency, but to be an 
effect of relationality through which action becomes possible. In other words, nothing 
acts in a vacuum but rather actors co-emerge with the relations that enact them. The 
subjects, in this case client and confessor, do not precede the relation through which 
they are enacted; they are an ector-network within which there are varius knowing 
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locations. It follows therefore that actors are such precisely because they are in a 
networked relationship, bearing in mind that chairs, pens, desks, case notes are as 
much part of the action as any humans involved. Similarly, a client and confessor only 
exist within a confessional network of relations.  
 
A network is always contingent, that is, it could be otherwise so it is in continual need 
of maintenance. Its reproduction can never be taken for granted; its configuration has 
to be worked at for it to hold together. Maintaining the stability of the network is vital 
and never ending, done through a process referred to as translation. This concept 
foregrounds the alignment of subjectivities, values and interests necessary to attain 
stability and order. Actors, both animate and inanimate, have diverse subjectivities, 
values and interests and these need to be interpreted, re-interpreted, represented and 
appropriated if they are to remain in a stable configuration.  The spread of confession 
to which Foucault alludes is therefore a way of stabilising certain types of relationality 
as part of a wider ordering of the social. 
 
Like Foucault, ANT does not constitute foundational subjects as isolated individuals 
or essential entities. Guidance can therefore be traced as practices that are not about 
penetrating deep-seated individualised meanings, getting to the 'core' of the self, but 
as ways of enacting the human as a confessing subject. By eschewing a psychologistic 
framework of explanation it does not privilege internal mentalistic processes. Instead 
the focus is on the material, on the mutual interaction of multiple intensities. All this 
has a significant bearing on how practices can be observed and understood. For ANT, 
these are not something that can exist separate from the context, but are rather 
dynamic activities distributed across knowers, the means of knowing and that which 
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is known and across extended time frames and multiple resources. Guidance does not 
take place in a context, but is enacted and enacts certain relation as if they were 
background contexts, including the histories and specifics of the client. It can be 
traced as a knowledge-producing process where the knowledge produced is a special 
kind of talk, or to put it another way, knowledge is discoursed into being through the 
confessional transactions of the guidance encounter. However, without a perceived 
'problem', there might not be a need for guidance at all. This problem tends to be 
defined in a particular and individualistic way through a humanistic discourse located 
in psychotherapy. With ANT, however, since a problem is not located within the 
individual but across the network, it is explored as a failure of translation that renders 
the network unstable, where instability is not always normatively a bad thing.  
 
Supplementing Foucault, ANT suggests theoretically that confession is enacted in 
multiple and complex forms, which in research terms means that the empirical 
messiness should not be reduced simply to a totalised and totalising Foucauldian 
concept confession. By contrast, the latter could be expanded upon and developd 
further through observation and inference. What we are suggesting then is that the 
notion of confession could be developd further through more empirically focussed 
studies of its enactments. Here ethnography and ethnomethodology emerge as 
methods associated with ANT studies (Latour 1999b, Fox 2006, Fenwick et al 2011). 
These focus in depth on the specific practices through which translation is enacted in 
particular contexts, in this case the translation of guidance as forms of confession. We 
can say therefore that ANT presents a way of researching the relational rather than 
individualistic and that gives equal importance to the non-human as well as human in 
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practices. This following of the process through which confession is enacted in 
guidance requires close observational study. 
 
Researching confession 
While ANT provides a methodological basis for empirically studying confessional 
practices, it is important to recognise that there are also differences. As we saw in the 
quote from Law above, ANT recognises its own debt to Foucault, or to put it another 
way, Foucault’s work is itself an actor in the network that constitutes actor-network 
theory. Nonetheless the differences are there and we end this chapter by briefly 
pointing to our understanding of what these are. Law’s argument here is instructive: 
What should we make of the difference between Foucault and ANT? If we say 
that objects are simply relational contingencies within ANT then it is primarily 
an empirical matter as to how they grow and how the relations producing them 
stabilise. This in turn means that in ANT the possibilities of the world are 
constrained but only contingently….[This] may be seen as a liberation from 
Foucault’s dark obsession with the limits to the conditions of possibility. From 
his pre-occupation with the way in which we have been almost invisibly 
imprisoned for the last 200 years in the logics and strategies of the modern 
episteme. (Law 2000: 2)  
 
What we understand by this is that whilst Foucault and ANT are both about power, 
how it is distributed and how it is mobilised and stabilised in ordering the social, 
Foucault seems to present a situation which argues for the inevitability of regulation. 
Only the forms of regulation change and, while Foucault also talks of resistance to 
regulation, this is not so richly and densely theorised. There is a sense therefore in 
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which Foucault imprisons us in a gloomy iron cage of confession, discipline and 
pastoral power. Guidance and other forms of confessing, indeed any form of 
contemporary management of people’s developmental trajectory, always ends up as 
regulation through self-regulation. The emphasis appears to be on the exercise of 
power as regulation, within limited room for transgression, despite Foucault’s own 
evocations of the productivities of power. 
 
With ANT however things could be otherwise. As Law argues in the quote above ‘the 
possibilities of the world are constrained but only contingently’. When ANT argues 
that the constructing of networks is an empirical matter, this means that things are not 
as they are because that is how they have to be as a matter of inexorable confessional 
logic. An actor-network is regulative but how power works through the network is 
construed as much more flexible and subject to change than in Foucault’s 
formulations of power. Networks are stabilised and mobilised by actors fabricating 
and negotiating common definitions and meanings and co-opting each other in their 
pursuit of knowledge-building. But at the same time networks can be dysfunctional, 
break down or be transformed. Stabilisation is for now. 
 
Foucault is important in that he reminds us that the human(e) practices of guidance 
are not immune from the workings of power through confession. ANT, however, 
gives us more of a theoretical handle on the dynamics of guidance practices and the 
methods through which to explore them empirically. Both theorisations provide 
important resources for understanding guidance differently, while eschewing the 
desire to become the basis for an alternative technology of guidance.  
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Guidance can be understood as the fabricating of confessional knowledge in action 
and interaction within settings where human and non-human actors are equally 
significant. It brings to our attention that knowledge enactment is a material process, 
within which there is the enacting and stabilising of the heterogeneous and the 
resistant. Confessional enactment is work, the mobilising of heterogeneous elements 
that require continual stabilising, precisely because of their resistance to such 
stabilisation. This is clearly a fruitful way of understanding what is happening in 
guidance practices. Guidance is translation work. The actor-network must be 
stabilised, interests and conflicts harmonised, if knowledge and self-knowledge is to 
be produced and if effective confession is to be enacted. Confession is a particular 
effect of particular actor-networks. This can be observed and traced. 
  
In thinking guidance differently using resources provided by ANT we can begin to 
understand guidance as an ordered network of heterogeneous materials where resistanc 
and conflict has been overcome to different degrees of stability. The guidance interview, 
can be understood as a mobilised network of actors, where the network goes beyond those 
in the immediate dialogic encounter. Translations may include, for example, the school or 
college, parents and family, government agencies, the education system, 
psychotherapeutic theories to name but a few. Guidance may be considered a complex 
relational field of actor-networks where through translation participants and participation 
are more or less successfully choreographed, thereby constituting particular orderings of 
space and time through particular mediations. The strength of ANT therefore is that it 
reflexively provides a theory of relationality through which to re-imagine guidance 
practices as a socio-technical web of spatialised subjectivity- and knowledge-enacting 
practices. Thus, rather than the emphasis being on a 'learner' constructed psychologically, 
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we can envisage an actor or subject who comes to know because they are located or 
positioned ‘at the right place in a network of materially heterogeneous elements’ (Law 
and Hetherington 2001: 3). Methodologically this entails some decisions about where to 
cut the network (Strathern 1996) in order to maintain a research focus, but answering that 
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